In 1891, the British philosopher Herbert Spencer was quoted as saying that a republic is “the highest form of government: but because of this requires the highest type of human nature – a type nowhere at present existing.” 1 Through means of hindsight, we can now evaluate the Weimar Republic of Germany to have failed by Spencer’s very definition. Two presidents and twelve chancellors between the end of World War I and the famous date of January 30, 1933 proved that each of the near twenty cabinets could not perform longer than eighteen months while several “disappeared into the wings” in less than three.2 Instead of the monarchy that had ruled for fifty years, this was now a republic made up of political parties that had long been in existence but had never ruled. With the Versailles Treaty looming over their decision making process, the new leaders of the republic had little choice but to move forward regardless of the backlash that would come from an inevitable opposition.3 Even the dozens of more minor political parties that were evolving could not prove large enough to form a stable government.4 The following essay will offer a chronicled overview of German political leaders between 1918 and 1933.

On November 9, 1918, Friedrich Ebert was handed the reigns of Germany just two days before an armistice was concluded among the players of World War I. His own ideals of upholding the monarchy fell quickly when Philipp Scheidmann, Ebert’s colleague in the Reichstag, gave a speech famously declaring, “Long live the great German Republic!” 5 This positioning was not necessarily an accurate picture of what the political powers were thinking. In the years that followed, a changed climate in parliamentary proceedings involved “shouting matches with each side showing contempt of the other.” It had spilled over into the streets where “all sides organized army squads of thugs” and brawls became common.6 Ebert was a calm and patient negotiator who had long earned the respect of his party for helping to bring various factions of the labor movement together even before his entry into the Reichstag in 1912.7 His diplomatic style would earn him political capital to work with a series of various chancellors and cabinets.

With the exile of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Holland, Ebert was given the heavy task of saving the nation by attempting to establish an urgent government of moderation. An assembly was formed in Weimar to develop the necessary administration that could keep Germany intact.8 In the early months of 1919, Scheidmann was employed by Ebert to be the first official Chancellor during the Weimar Republic. Soon after, on May 7, his newly formed cabinet received the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Their response was so “unanimously negative” that Scheidmann made a speech at the University of Berlin claiming the allied powers were trying to make the Germans “slaves and helots…doing forced labor behind barbed wire and prison bars.” He concluded his speech with a declaration that acceptance of Versailles would be incompatible with “German honor.” When it came down to the Reichstag vote, however, the legislators did not support him and the vote was 75 to 39 in favor of acceptance. On June 20, Scheidmann resigned his post.9 Resignations from the heads of state would soon become a patterned trend of those whose policies were not approved or whose decisions were not agreed upon in the Reichstag.

Gustav Bauer, who had a reputation for corruption and taking bribes, formed a new minority government initially on the side of Ebert and Scheidmann in rejection of the Versailles Treaty.10 On June 22, the text of the treaty was again debated, but the next day it found favor 237 votes to 138. Nearly a year later in March of 1920, Lieutenant General von Luttwitz and Reichstag politician Wolfgang Kapp planned a putsch to move Bauer out of office in favor of the monarchy.11 Even though the Kapp Putsch had no success, the chancellor once again resigned for reasons that can only be categorized as great pressure of the radical left who were simply unsettled about the idea of a republic.

An invaluable observation at this point would be a review of the things accomplished during the leadership of Weimar’s first two chancellors. Constitutional governments were not a new thing to the German people. After all, it was under the monarch in 1867 that the North German Confederation first introduced such an idea. When it was adapted to approval in 1871, the Reichstag was first given parliamentary value. There was to be an emperor who controlled all aspects of foreign policy. He was empowered to appoint and dismiss a chancellor, or head of civilian administration. Even more provocative was his ability to close the Reichstag for any reason at all that he deemed necessary whether just or unjust.12 The constitution that had been approved by Ebert and Bauer on July 31, 1919 was essentially a modified version of the one that had been drafted almost fifty years before. In place of the Kaiser, there was now to be a Reich president elected by the people and their popular vote. In January of 1919, Ebert’s Majority Socialist party received a total of 11.5 million votes which amounted to 38 percent of the vote. He had not received a majority, but for the first relatively questionable election of the Weimar Republic, Ebert did not count it as a loss. The constitution that would arise out of the next few months created several stipulations that he used very much to his benefit in securing the state from the threat against his minority win.13

Article 48 allowed the president to use the army to restore law if he thought there was any level of threat. What made this article so dangerous was that Article 25 permitted the president to dissolve the Reichstag should they reject one of his decrees. During the course of his presidency, Ebert would go on to use this no less than 136 times at his disposal.14 Adding fuel to the fire of risk, the president was additionally given full command of the armed forces, the freedom to order new elections, or to call for a national referenda.15 And in stark contrast to the American Senate’s power of the purse, the Reichstag was forced to relinquish control over its military budget in the amount of 90 percent.16

Beyond the basic permissions of the legislative and executive branches in Germany, there were other more domestic problems causing havoc within the constitution. The “Pulpit Paragraph” passed through the Reichstag in 1871 and remained until 1953 making political agitation in sermons illegal. Religious schools were also put under strict state control throughout the Weimar Republic.17 Articles 146 and 147 gave equality of opportunity by specifying a standard type of elementary school for all children. This educational effort would be somewhat reduced by the continued existence of preparatory schools for those who could afford the fees. On a much greater influential level, university professors had a near monopolistic anti-democratic view that they preached in their lectures by establishing historical textbooks that denied Germany having any share in causing World War I.18

Article 1 gave “political authority to the people,” but this had an effect of complicating the legislative process by increasing the number of parties and making it unlikely that any single party would ever command a majority. Article 129 guaranteed all members of state service their “well earned rights” and recognized their freedom of political opinion and expression as long as this did not conflict with Article 130, their loyalty to the state. Article 54 guaranteed judicial positions the right to express their monarchist sentiments from the bench.19 All in all, what was established to be a democratic constitution was written as a mere shadow of the previous framework under the Kaiser. One could argue that the reason so many statements in the new law led to continued strife was the pressure that existed in 1919 to simply get the job done without fully losing the constitutional structure of the monarchy. Whether they saw it coming or not, President Ebert would watch more administrations rise and full under his watch during the years following Bauer’s resignation.

When Hermann Muller took over the chancellorship in early 1920, his eventual “grand coalition” was not yet a factor and he faded quickly to the more elderly Centrist leader, Constantin Fehrenbach whose position as chancellor took on the weight of solving reparation issues with the Versailles Treaty. Germans were obligated to “pay all costs of the allied occupation of the Rhineland, although their expenditures for this were not to be credited against their reparations obligation. The allied government demanded that payments begin in August 1919 and that they reach twenty billion gold marks by May 1, 1921.” Fehrenbach knew that there needed to be moderation when the major shipments of coal and industry had been interrupted by the Kapp Putsch in the spring of 1920. He was invited to make a case for alternative plans and submit a plea at a conference in Spa in July 1920. What stopped this meeting from being successful was the presence of General von Seeckt and several of his staff who were dressed in military attire. The meeting naturally led to certain tensions and emotions flared. Upon being denied mediation by the US government under the unsympathetic President Harding, Fehrenbach turned in his resignation on May 5, 1921 after the allies came in to apply pressure.20

Kicked around by an allied ultimatum, the new Centrist Chancellor Joseph Wirth had no alternative but to sign any arrangements set before his cabinet. Wirth noted that it was politically unfeasible to increase taxes in order to pay reparations and therefore “borrowed heavily from banks, increased the government debt, and fueled the already alarming inflation.” During his year of service, he proposed a rejected reform bill on currency-control regulations and increases in the discount rate. An ever increasing series of economic problems led to his being overthrown in November 1922.21 With nearly $5 billion in American foreign investment loans going to Germany that would enable them to avoid defaulting on reparations, it isn’t hard to conceive of Wirth’s inevitable downfall.22 He began his administration without many economic options and those limitations curtailed his entire cabinet into the ground for failures that could not have turned out any differently.

Next on the political chopping block was a prominent businessman named Wilhelm Cuno. He was head of the Hamburg-American Shipping Line and was considered to be a brilliant negotiator when it came to high level business agreements. Cuno had even been invited to participate in the reparations talks in July 1920 with Fehrenbach and Ebert. Unlike others in the government, Cuno had no responsible party ties and made no secret of his “scorn for politicians and their art.” In reality, this made him the perfect Ebert selection to bring about new leadership and vision from outside “the argumentative politics of the Weimar Republic.” 23

This seemingly perfect choice had hardly been in office when, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission, “against the wishes of the British delegation, sent five French divisions and a team of experts into the Ruhr to discover why Germany was failing to meet its payments. Most Germans regarded the French action as invasion and united to resist them.” 24 Cuno called for a general strike or “passive resistance” that resulted only in the French imposing martial law. Apart from the invasion, the chancellor might have been able to achieve some necessary adjustments to the economy, but on August 13, he was replaced by Gustav Stresemann after being informed on August 11 that the Reichstag delegation no longer had confidence in his ability to lead them.25

Almost unnoticed and far from economic discussion was that Cuno, before his departure, had worked closely with Hans von Seeckt to build up a secret reserve army under the title of “labor battalions.” This was, of course, an illegal force, but Seeckt was willing to give Chancellor Cuno the full resources of the army in this development. By September 1923, between fifty and eighty thousand men had been enrolled in what came to be called the Black Reichswehr.26 During the Reichswehr period of 1919 to 1933, a new type of soldier was needed to succeed in leadership. This soldier would be a “warrior willing and able to subordinate himself yet be capable of independent action.” A “will-to-die” style was replaced by a “will-to-live” order.27

Gustav Stresemann came into the office of chancellor as a “rational republican” who hated the revolution, but saw no alternative to the parliamentary regime. On September 26, 1923, he announced the end of passive resistance which branded him as an “artificial Jew.” His labor policies included efforts to abolish their hard earned 8 hour day. Yet another resignation was forced on October 3, but the chancellor returned in just a few days with new representation. Easily persuaded Germans began to see him as a strong leader within just weeks when Adolf Hitler’s absurd march through Munich on November 9 provided Stresemann with an opportunity to stand out in putting down the Beer Hall Putsch. From 1920 to 1923, the Nazis were a “splinter group on the far right, based mainly in Bavaria” that served as a minority nuisance.28 Still, the chancellor felt public distrust and made an unusual decision before the putsch on October 23 to call for a “vote of confidence.” He lost 231 votes to 151 in the Reichstag. The president would later remark that for the next 10 years, the Germans would suffer the consequences of voting him out.29 What Ebert did not know was that Stresemann would remain in each of the next administrations as a constant civil servant with a developing reputation for solving foreign relations.

Where Stresemann could not succeed in domestic affairs, Ebert selected Wilhelm Marx to his first term as chancellor. He was indeed a distant relative of the famous German theorist Karl Marx.30 Wilhelm was a Catholic politician who was known for being quite dull, but highly competent as a Centre Party administrator. Chancellor Marx had a reputation for his commitment to democracy, but eventually stepped out of his role to run a campaign for president in February of 1925 upon the death of President Ebert.31

The 1925 presidential campaign brought Field Marshal von Hindenburg back into the national spotlight after his decorated years of service in the great Battle of Tannenberg during World War I. His election was seen as a “symbol of restoration” going back to the monarchy.32 The man who had once coined the phrase, “stabbed in the back” was now in the highest level of the Weimar Republic.33 His stature was bulky and physically imposing, but he was an avid servant to Germany who “never breached the constraints imposed by the constitution.” 34

Hans Luther, the first chancellor under Hindenburg, joined Stresemann, now the Foreign Secretary, to meet in March 1926 in Geneva with those in the League of Nations about the possibility of gaining a seat. The conclusion of this meeting left them embarrassed and irritated when the German press hounded them about their failure. A reason for this social pressure could be attributed to Luther’s Locarno Pact of 1925 in which he and Stresemann officially agreed to demilitarize the Rhineland. Even though he viewed it optimistically by saying, “Never has a delegation had such success,” many in the Weimar Republic saw this as a means to steal further bravado from the German leadership.35 Failure to gain a seat in the League of Nations that next spring put the nail in Luther’s coffin when Marx returned once again to establish a more secure administration.

Between his first chancellorship beginning in November of 1923 and his second one ending in the summer of 1928, Marx was worn down from having set up four different cabinet systems.36 On the eve of the Great Depression, Marx resigned because of the strains he was facing in his own administration. Hoping to see power remain in the hands of his own Centrist party, Marx recommended Heinrich Bruning as the next chancellor, but Bruning would have to wait until a later date. Instead, what came to be known as one of the republic’s most stable and durable governments grew out of Hermann Muller, the head of a “Grand Coalition.” 37

Chancellor Muller, by historical necessity, can be classified as the first “political victim” of the Great Depression as it stretched into Europe’s economic structure. His eventual resignation would mark the “beginning of the end of Weimar democracy.” 38 With the death of Gustav Stresemann on October 3, 1929, just days before the Stock Market crash in New York, Muller’s cabinet had more important things on their minds than foreign affairs. His failure to take seriously the conditions of Wall Street would have a “devastating effect on the German economy which was heavily dependent on loans from American banks.” 39 The administration voted to proceed with the construction of armored cruisers that had been authorized by the Versailles Treaty. On the surface, this appeared to be an expense invested into military defense, but in reality, the people would begin to shout, “Not armored cruisers, but food for children!” The economy was slipping into a recession that failed to gain a tendered response or treatment.40 It didn’t take much time for the chancellor to gain the unfortunate, yet applicable title of “Versailles Muller.” By March of 1930, facing serious illness, he was forced to resign upon seeing his “Great Coalition” become “a pathetic collection of disgruntled and quarrelsome ideologues, blind to the weaknesses of parliamentary democracy.” 41 What had been intended to serve as an efficient legislative system for the first time since World War I was simply not happening. The Reichstag sat on average about one hundred days a year from 1920 to 1930. By 1931, they had very little decision making power left in the political process.42

With a failing parliament, Heinrich Bruning was employed by President Hindenburg to introduce a new government that was independent of previous systems. One of his first points of business was an austerity program designed to increase taxes and cut benefits for the greater good of the economy. When the Reichstag voted against his proposal, Hindenburg exercised Article 48 and dissolved parliament. Any historian searching for patterns would presume that Bruning would have faded away quickly because of this positioning, but he remained the chancellor for more than two years. During his tenure, the Nazis gained one hundred seats in the Reichstag. The Centrist government had proved “unable to overcome the economic crisis” and the people gave 37.3% of their vote to make the Nazis the second largest party in the Reichstag.43 As their popularity ever increased and Bruning met with Hitler in October of 1930, he believed that by ending reparations (which he was unable to achieve), the radical right would lose much of its appeal. The great difficulty wasn’t in theorizing a potential end to part of Versailles. Rather, it was his lack of concern for “widespread misery and helplessness” from the austerity program that was leading Germany once again into civil war. Some began to call Bruning the “Hunger Chancellor” as people associated him with mass murderer Fritz Haarmann. For all intensive purposes, even though his leadership lasted more than most, he would become the most unpopular chancellor there had yet been in the Weimar Republic.44

As a man who thought in terms of “measures rather than people,” 45 the chancellor was ousted in favor of an old political friend of the president. Franz von Papen devoted his months of service to the idea of creating a “New State.” His cabinet was made up of men with relatively little to no experience. Still trying to suppress the impending street fights on July 29, 1932, the new chancellor imposed a ban on public political meetings. Instead of helping, this fueled the violence even further. Minister of Defense Kurt von Schleicher quietly informed Papen that the army was no longer willing to give him their support.46 To his credit of successes, the chancellor had managed to peacefully depose of the Prussian government and gain an immediate police force of near ninety thousand men with the resources of a large federal state. His connections with the Catholic church and circles of industry was admirable for the cause of a new state, but his prudent resignation was forced by the gradually fading leadership of President Hindenburg.47

With the president not yet prepared to give up the idea of a parliamentary system, Schleicher took his seat as chancellor in the absence of any political leader willing to do so. Having sympathized with the Nazi program, the new chancellor invited Hitler to be a part of his cabinet. A refusal of participation quickly perpetuated the efforts of Papen to encourage President Hindenburg toward the appointment of Hitler as chancellor. The new year saw depression results appearing to bottom out and Schleicher, a military man by nature, was preparing a massive job-creation program to revive unemployment throughout the state. He had even set in motion a plan to nationalize the steel industry.48

The chancellor’s intention of “establishing an authoritarian corporate state, to eliminate the Reichstag by presidential decree, to put the army in control, and to suppress the Nazis altogether” was quickly ended at 11:30am on the morning of January 30, 1933. President Hindenburg abruptly planted Hitler in the title role that would propel a new age of Germany and introduce many other papers, books, and studies beyond this essay.49

Disguised by two presidents and twelve chancellors, the failure of the Weimar Republic to succeed was not, in this historic view, because of poor intentions. On the contrary, each leader took on an aspect of necessity to the betterment of the state whether it was the writing of a constitution, the building of a secret defense, the attempted restoration of a sinking economy, or the focus on foreign diplomacy to keep peace. The difficulty came not in these individual efforts, but in the collectively unsettled minds of the German people who still desired a sovereign executive at heart. With no one truly serving to inspire direction on all fronts and take the reigns of government, the single-mindedness of each chancellor from Scheidmann to Schleicher left the public using their democracy to restore the monarchy that they had lost. Thus, the twelve chances of failure in the republic escorted their society into the arms of Hitler’s Germany.